Introduction
Understanding banks' risk behavior is essential from a financial stability perspective. Banks' risk-taking incentives are shaped, among other factors, by the compensation of their top managers. Yet, top managers, and in particular CEOs, are remunerated with compensation packages that are highly complex, especially in their variable elements, and vary greatly between banks and across countries. If these packages influence top managers' appetite for risk, a sound understanding of their determinants and how these might affect banks' risk-taking incentives becomes highly important for successful regulation.
This issue has been debated at length in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Former US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, testifying in front of a Senate Appropriations subcommittee in June 2009, argued that "although many things caused this crisis, what happened to compensation and the incentives in creative risk-taking did contribute in some institutions to the vulnerability that we saw."
A consensus seems to exist among at least some researchers and policy-makers that, at the onset of the crisis, financial institutions took on excessive risk, notwithstanding the risk management and prudential policies that were already in place (Hellwig (2009) ; Admati and Hellwig (2014) ). In particular, distortionary compensation practices at large financial institutions have been identified as one of the possible elements for the failure of governance in the banking industry (Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) or Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) ). The Financial Stability Forum (2009) set the stage for a new policy on executive compensation in the banking industry. It argued that " [c] ompensation practices at large financial institutions are one factor among many that contributed to the financial crisis that began in 2007. High short-term profits led to generous bonus payments to employees without adequate regard to the longer-term risks they imposed on their firms. These perverse incentives amplified the excessive risk-taking that severely threatened the global financial system and left firms with fewer resources to absorb losses as risks materialized. The lack of attention to risk also contributed to the large, in some cases extreme absolute level of compensation in the industry." Cerasi and Oliviero (2015) show, after controlling for regulatory and institutional factors, that a combination of lax regulation and greater variable pay for CEOs (namely stock options and/or bonus related to performance) was associated with an inferior financial performance at some banks during the 2007-08 financial crisis. This accords with more recent evidence on the relevance of several other aspects of corporate governance for explaining the ex-post performance of banks (Laeven and Levine (2009) ; Beltratti and Stulz (2012) ; Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)) . 1 Yet, in spite of this evidence, we still lack a good understanding of time-related and cross-country heterogeneity in banks' CEO compensation schemes.
How can we explain the differences we observe in the way banks reward their CEOs? Given that bank CEOs are held accountable for their incentive to seek tail risks, has the structure of CEO compensation changed since the financial crisis? Has bank regulation affected the way CEOs are paid? These are the questions we try to address in this paper.
We analyze the structure of CEO compensation within a sample of international banks from 2006 to 2014. To perform our analysis, we use a detailed database from S&P Capital IQ that reports the different elements of banks' CEO compensation, which we integrate with information on bank balance sheet data and information on the macroeconomic and institutional setting. In particular, we study how CEO compensation has responded to measures of profitability and risk over the years. Finally, we use the recent changes in the regulation of bankers' pay to control for the presence of a structural break. particularly at systemically relevant financial institutions. The P&S require compensation practices in the financial industry to align all employees' incentives with the long-term profitability of the firm. Moreover, the P&S call for effective governance of compensation, and for compensation to be adjusted for all types of risk, to be symmetrical with risk outcomes, and to be sensitive to the time horizon of risks. As the P&S are intended to apply to all significant financial institutions headquartered in FSB and EU jurisdictions (through the adoption of the CRD IV), we can consider these banks as the "affected" (or "treated") group and compare their behavior with financial intermediaries in other jurisdictions that are "unaffected" ("not treated"), i.e., the "control group". The P&S policy was transposed into national regulation in 2011 for all banks within FSB jurisdictions and EU countries included in our sample; this allows us to neatly test the differing effects in affected and unaffected banks.
First, we find that the affected banks have changed CEO compensation policies more than the banks in the control group have. Second, the analysis shows that the affected banks have made the variable elements of CEO compensation less responsive to measures of short-term performance, while more negatively correlated to measures of risk. Third, we find that CEO compensation in investment banks has became much more sensitive to risk measures than in the case at commercial banks. Finally, our analysis indicates that the policy had a greater impact on banks where risk management governance was weaker (i.e. at those that lacked a chief risk officer (CRO) before the implementation of the policy), in line with the results in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) .
Our paper is not the first one to empirically analyze the relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking after the financial crisis. Many papers have already used information from the US and other advanced economies to study the evolution of the different elements of CEO compensation (see, for example, Gregg et al. (2012) ; Cheng et al. (2015) ; DeYoung et al. (2013) ; Bhagat and Bolton (2014) ).
Other papers have also focused on the relationship between CEO compensation and risk, such as Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) , Gregg et al. (2012) , Chesney et al. (2012) and Cheng et al. (2015) ; these papers are centered mainly on the financial crisis in the US and UK.
A few papers also control for country heterogeneity and regulation, exploiting information on international banks, such as Huttenbrinka et al. (2014) and Cerasi and Oliviero (2015) .
Finally, there are several papers showing the importance of corporate governance for bank risk, such as Laeven and Levine (2009) , Gropp and Kohler (2010) ; Beltratti and Stulz (2012) , and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) ; however CEO compensation is not part of their analysis, with the exception of that of Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) where the CRO's importance in the hierarchy is the principal focus.
The novelty of our paper is to explore in more detail the variable part of CEO compensation in relation to the institutional and macro-economic characteristics of the country in which the bank is headquartered comparing the pre-and post-crisis period. Our paper uses the introduction of the P&S as an experimental setting to design a specific test for such a change in behavior.
A few papers have previously analyzed how the introduction of the regulation has affected CEO compensation (Ferrarini and Ungureanu (2011) or the review in Murphy (2013) ). However, these papers focus mainly on one specific aspect of the new regulation, namely the introduction of a bonus cap, without exploiting the cross-country heterogeneity in the regulation's application. The only paper, to our knowledge, to have conducted an empirical analysis of the new regulation is Kleymenova and Tuna (2016) : through an event studies approach, they study how financial markets responded to the news of the introduction of a bonus cap on executive compensation in the UK and in the EU.
They show that the impact of the new UK regulation was larger than that of the subsequent bonus cap in the EU, which may have reflected the un-anticipated feature of the second policy measure. Our paper complements this analysis by exploiting the cross-sectional information between the jurisdictions that did and those that did not apply the P&S policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and the evolution of bank CEO compensation prior and after the financial crisis. Section 3 discusses the changes in the regulation of bankers' pay and the evolution of CEO variable compensation. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis of the impact of the P&S policy, while Section 5 is devoted to several robustness checks. The last section summarizes the main conclusions of the paper.
Evolution of CEO compensation over time
In this section we study the evolution of CEO variable compensation in banks after the financial crisis. Information on CEO compensation was sourced from S&P Capital IQ -People
Intelligence and Capital Structure -between 2006 and 2014 for 173 banks located in 36 countries. In particular, we selected the ten largest financial institutions (among the commercial, savings and investment banks) in each country for which we found information on CEO compensation. 2 Our sample is therefore limited by the actual number of banks disclosing this information. Disclosure on executive compensation is quite common among the largest and listed banks, although not everywhere mandatory; this explains why this information is not available for all the largest banks. We have also collected accounting records and weekly stock returns at individual bank level (only for listed banks). At a more detailed level, we can identify the CEO at any time for each specific bank together with their compensation. The remuneration of CEOs combines several elements (fixed salary, cash bonus, equity shares and stock option awards, long term benefits, etc.). Total annual compensation of a bank CEO is the sum of all cash and non-cash rewards in a specific year t (including equity shares and stock options awarded in year t): it does not include stock options awarded in year (t − 1) or before, even when liquidated in year t. Since the variable part of CEO compensation can be very complex and differs considerably between CEOs, we choose to focus on this component as our main variable of interest. The variable part of total compensation is computed by subtracting the fixed salary from the total annual compensation. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of our sample, both for the main bank characteristics and their CEO's compensation. In particular, the first part of the table reports the composition of our sample according to bank models (investment vs. commercial banks) and geographic area (North America and Australia; Asia and Africa and Europe). Interestingly, European banks account for 44 percent of the sample, while 21 percent are North American and Australian banks and around 36 percent are Asian banks, with only few banks from two African countries.
Descriptive statistics
In our sample, 19 percent of the banks are investment banks. All banks are listed on the stock market. The average bank in the sample has $1.5 billion in total assets and a Tier 1 ratio of 11.8 percent.
CEO compensation statistics are detailed in the second part of the table. Annual total compensation per individual bank CEO is on average $3.8 million, while the fixed salary is around $1 million. Variable compensation represents on average 51 percent of a CEO's total compensation. About 37 percent of variable compensation is given by short-term cash rewards, while around 63 percent is via non-cash compensation (e.g., stock options, restricted stock awards, equity shares, etc.). Banks that award stock options to their CEOs account for 37 percent of our sample.
In Table 2 , we report the descriptive statistics for a selected number of variables by dividing the sample into two sub-periods: pre-and post-financial crisis. We excluded 2008, the year of the Lehman Brothers' default at the start of the financial crisis. We observe a deterioration in all measures of banks' performance, return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), and both measures of risk, non-performing loans (NPL) and stock return volatility (SRV) have all increased since the financial crisis. Total compensation since the financial crisis has fallen on average by $2 million per CEO; the variable part of CEO compensation has been squeezed case of Poland, the top banks changed over the years and we had to include additional ones; elsewhere, fewer than ten banks were observed, as in the case of Italy, because of mergers and acquisitions and a lack of information on CEO's remuneration at the smaller banks. from 59 to 49 percent: this is due to a reduction in both cash variable compensation and stock awards. It is interesting to note that the fixed part of CEO compensation, the salary, has also fallen, from $1.23 million to $1.11 million on average, i.e., by $120,000 since the financial crisis.
In Figure 1 , we plot the evolution of CEOs' compensation levels and composition, distinguishing between commercial and investment banks. Total compensation dropped from an average of $6 million in 2007 to $3 million in 2008 because of the global financial crisis.
This drop has been more pronounced for investment banks than for commercial banks. The composition of the compensation, as captured by the share of variable over total compensation, follows a similar pattern as we can see in the second panel of Figure 1 . In particular, it falls from about 60 percent in 2007 to 45 percent in the post-crisis years for commercial banks. For investment banks the drop is larger, although rising again in the recent years. As a matter of fact, commercial and investment banks have different business models and different incentive structures for management. The difference is evident prior to the crisis, although total compensation is more homogeneous afterwards. It would be interesting to ascertain if a different catch-up process was in place after the introduction of the post-crisis regulatory changes. This could at least in part explain the convergence process for total compensation, although the composition differs between bank business models. In Figure 3 , we plot banks' performance, profitability (measured as ROE) and risk (measured as standard deviation of weekly stock prices), distinguishing the two different bank business models. In the first panel, we see that investment banks' profits are more volatile than those of commercial banks and that this is also reflected in a higher level of risk in the second panel. Profits for commercial banks during the global financial crisis were more stable, probably due to their greater degree of revenue diversification. During the financial crisis, risk increased for both investment and commercial banks, declining after the crisis for both types of bank.
The graphical analysis is suggestive of changes in the economic conditions that may have affected the variable part of CEO compensation. Clearly, after the crisis, banks have performed worse and this explains why their CEOs received a lower share of variable compensation, which is typically tied to performance. Also the volatility in performance may have affected the 3 The definition of a country that has been affected by the global financial crisis is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2012) variable compensation for CEOs. However, the crisis has obliged countries to adopt changes in their prudential policy, and this may have affected CEO compensation.
It would be interesting to ask whether the response with respect to short-term profitability and risk has changed in response to country-specific shocks or to regulatory changes. In any case, we need to control for these factors and we will devote particular attention to check the robustness of our results with respect to specific country characteristics.
The change in regulation of bankers' pay
After the 2007-08 financial crisis, the Financial Stability Forum and its successor, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) were mandated by various stakeholders, including central banks, treasury ministers, and stock market gatekeepers, to provide new guidelines for executive compensation at banks. The FSB's "Principles and Standards of Sound Compensation" (P&S) mainly concern the design of executive compensation, and in general the remuneration of all Material Risk Takers (MRTs) in banks, including CEOs. Furthermore, the FSB called for executive compensation to be increasingly tied to the risks assumed in the banking core business. This is achieved, on the one hand, by designing the variable part of the compensation of executives in relation to (ex-ante) risk measures; and, on the other hand, by introducing some form of deferrals in the compensation, through claw-back clauses, to ensure there is enough time to observe the actual achievement of (ex-post) lower tail risk. After the publication of the Principles, the Standards were implemented in 2011.
Principles of Sound Compensation (P&S)
This section discusses the content of the nine Principles that are at the heart of the P&S policy and their implications. The Principles explicitly underline the relationship between managerial compensation and risk appetite within the bank organization (see Financial Stability Forum (2009) ). Before the financial crisis, this relationship was not well recognized.
While managerial compensation was set with the aim of motivating or retaining hard-working and talented managers, the risk appetite of the bank was monitored by the risk management committee, which had no say on managerial compensation.
After the crisis it was clear that the structure of managerial compensation indeed affected the risk appetite of the bank. Rewarding managers with equity grants, for instance, increased their focus on short-term objectives, while it reduced their incentive to achieve outcomes in the lower tail of the performance distribution.
The nine Principles are divided under three main headings: corporate governance (Principle P1 to P3), compensation (Principle P4 to P7) and supervision (Principle P8 to P9).
Corporate governance. These three principles discipline the way banks must set the managerial compensation. Although the FSB clearly states that there is no single system of compensation (i.e. that "one size does not fit all"), the chosen system must still comply with the features listed below.
• P1: Independence of the compensation system. Insiders (CEO and management team) must be restricted from influencing their own remuneration.
• P2: Accountability of compensation system. Performance and risk measures must be observable and easy to evaluate, so that achievements to which compensation is related can be easily assessed by all parties.
• P3: Integrity of risk measures. Risk managers must be independent, and avoid setting risk targets in the interests of insiders and allowing them to game their compensation.
Compensation. These four principles, which are more relevant for our analysis, state the main rules to follow when setting the structure of managerial compensation.
• P4: Heterogeneity of managerial compensations. Within the same organization, each MRT must be compensated according to his own marginal contribution to bank risk.
• P5: Symmetry in the elasticity of compensation to risk outcomes. Compensation must vary in a symmetrical way, either up or down, conditional on performance and risk outcomes.
• P6: Deferrals. Compensation must take into account the length of the time required for risk to materialize and allow for the compensation to vary as a function of a specific risk outcome.
• P7: Optimal mix of cash and equity. Stock options, equity grants and cash bonuses should be set in an optimal combination in order to moderate excessive risk-taking.
The document states clearly that each bank must be able to freely decide its optimal compensation structure, provided that the chosen structure complies with these principles. Each bank must find its own way to apply sound compensation practices. Some banks may prefer to rely on quantitative measures, while others on discretion when relating the performance of their own employees to the share of risk undertaken.
Supervision. These two principles define the tasks of supervisors and disclosure of information outside and inside the bank.
• P8: Supervisors must ensure implementation of compensation principles. National supervisors must monitor the application of compensation practices either at bank level within the same country and among countries to ensure an even application of the principles to avoid regulatory arbitrage.
• P9: Disclosure of compensation. Enough disclosure must be assured at the bank level both for the interests of all stake-holders and for the supervisors' needs.
The P&S are not international standards that, once implemented in domestic jurisdictions, become supervisory or regulatory norms to which each bank must comply. The question therefore arises as to how to ensure that the Principles will be adopted by all the banks that authorities consider significant for this purpose. Each national supervisor is responsible for the implementation of the relevant national regulation or supervisory guidance, whereas the FSB has identified compensation as one of the priority areas for implementation monitoring, with a dedicated monitoring framework to review and support implementation by all member jurisdictions. At the national level, there are different degrees of intervention in case a bank fails to comply. The national supervisor i) can exercise moral suasion to convince the bank to comply; then it can escalate using ii) firmer interventions within the range of supervisory actions that are applied, including, where available, increasing the bank's specific prudential requirements, such as capital requirements. At the supranational level, coordination among supervisors has the objective to prevent regulatory arbitrage by multi-national institutions.
To understand whether and how quickly the principles have been translated into national laws, we computed an index of the intensity of regulation. Figure 4 shows that the full set of P&S were immediately implemented in the countries belonging to the FSB in our data sample (solid line), while for other countries not represented in our sample the implementation was a bit slower (dashed line). The behavior of the index displays a step-wise convergence of regulatory intensity from 2011 to the final year in our sample.
Testable implications
Following the discussion of the principles, we provide here the list of the hypothesis to be tested.
First, the set of principles from P4 to P8 has the purpose of changing the structure of CEO compensation in banks.
• Hypothesis 1: Has the percentage of the variable over total compensation of CEOs changed as a consequence of the implementation of the P&S?
The aim of the new regulation is to influence CEO compensation with a view to dampening banks' risk incentives. As a first step, we aim to see whether there has been a change in the structure of CEO compensation. The complex structure of CEOs' remuneration can be more easily captured by looking at the share of variable compensation. If the norms contained in the P&S have been applied, we should detect a change (reduction) in the balance of variable and total compensation.
• Hypothesis 2: Do we observe heterogeneity in the impact of the P&S on our sample of banks?
The regulator states that "one size does not fit all", as banks are free to find their optimal compensation structure in line with the norms in the P&S. Hence we expect to observe a heterogeneous impact of the principles across banks in our sample. In general we control for unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics of the individual banks that could alter the response to the implementation of the P&S by adding bank fixed effects. However, it could be that banks with different business models or corporate governance quality, responded differently to the application of the principles. First of all, we control for the bank business model to see whether commercial or investment banks have made greater changes to their compensation policy after the implementation of the P&S. Investment banks tend to pay their CEOs with a greater share of variable compensation in order to attract the most talented individuals. However, given their core business and the lighter regulatory framework in which they operate, their performance is more volatile. Then, if the main goal of the P&S policy is to mitigate risk incentives, we expect CEOs' compensation in investment banks to be more affected by the introduction of this policy compared to commercial banks.
As for the quality of the corporate governance that matters for risk incentives, following the results in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) , we control for the importance of the risk management function within the bank hierarchy. If the risk officer sits on the board, this signals the importance attached by the bank's shareholders to risk management.
So we control for the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) before the financial crisis, to distinguish between banks that were at the time relatively more aware of the importance of the risk management and those with weaker governance on this respect. We expect the policy to be less effective, other things being equal, for banks with a higher governance quality: this would imply that banks with a stronger risk management were those less in need of reforming their compensation structure.
• Hypothesis 3: Has the sensitivity of the variable compensation with respect to short-term performance changed after the implementation of the P&S policy?
Principle P5 requires CEO compensation to become more responsive to bad outcomes, i.e. it should be reduced whenever measures of performance fall. In the meantime, P6 requires compensation to respond only after the observation of the performance outcome. This means that we should control whether the response of the variable part of the compensation, by definition more sensitive to short-term performance, has diminished after the implementation of the principles.
• Hypothesis 4: Has the sensitivity of the variable compensation with respect to risk measures increased after the P&S?
Principle P6 requires executives to be penalized after bad outcomes occur, by extending the time elapsed between their actions and their monetary reward, so that there is enough time to observe the outcome of the risks undertaken. For the P&S to bite on risk-taking incentives, we must be able to observe a change in the response of variable compensation to measures of risk.
• Hypothesis 5: Do we observe a greater CEOs' turnover after the P&S?
The introduction of the principles may have also contributed to changes in the composition of the board and in the executive leadership. If this is the case, we expect to see a rise in CEO turnover after the implementation of the P&S once we control for other factors that may explain CEO turnover.
Impact of the policy
In order to control for the effect of the P&S policy on the structure of CEOs' variable compensation, we adopt an approach that compares affected ("treated") with unaffected ("not treated") banks.
To this end we drew up a list of affected banks from two sources: (i) those headquartered in the countries 4 affiliated to the FSB and (ii) those operating in EU countries (within the CRD IV these countries have adopted a mandatory amendment with the P&S guidelines).
Both groups (i) and (ii) were under the scrutiny of national bank supervisors that exerted moral suasion to adopt the new principles soon after implementation. Given the national and international supervisory pressure on the affected banks, these have changed their executive remuneration policy in 2011. As shown in the previous section, by referring to the behavior of the regulatory index, this policy became effective in 2011 for all the banks included in our sample. It is worth stressing that all the banks in EU countries adopted the P&S through the implementation of the CRD IV. 5 Hence, we include among the affected banks all the financial institutions headquartered in EU countries, even if they did not belong to an FSB country. As a result, the percentage of affected banks in our sample is 74 percent, and about 22 percent of the affected are investment banks. The policy came into effect in 2011, while the CRD IV took effect only in January 2014: we still consider 2011 as the beginning of the treatment under the presumption that the implementation of regulation was de facto anticipated as anecdotal evidence suggests. As a robustness check, however, we will allow for a different initial treatment year for banks located in EU countries.
Is there a structural change in the variable over total compensation of CEOs as a consequence of the implementation of the P&S?
We start by comparing the structure of executive compensation of the affected banks with the banks in the control group. Following Hypothesis 1, we expect to observe a drop in variable over total compensation for those countries that adapted the P&S in 2011. In Figure 
Are affected banks different? Test for sorting bias
This preliminary evidence is suggestive of a role played by the policy in affecting CEOs'
compensation. But this evidence may simply reflect a sorting bias. It could be that either the affected banks, or their CEOs, have some special characteristics that explain the behavior of the response of the share of variable compensation to bank performance and risk, although independently of the introduction of the P&S. For instance, affected banks may be more risk-averse and therefore tend to design flatter managerial compensation schemes for their CEOs. To shed some light on the importance of this possible bias, we perform a dynamic test for sorting, similar to that in Foà et al. (2015) , for the selection of banks in the P&S policy.
Specifically, we collect information on the age and the gender of the CEO, both factors which might influence risk-taking. Moreover, we control for bank-specific characteristics before the adoption of the policy, such as measures of profitability (ROE and ROA), as well as measures of risk, diversification and leverage ratios. The dependent variable is the treatment dummy, which takes value 1 if a bank is affected and 0 otherwise. The sample is limited to observations up to 2011, i.e. before the implementation of the P&S policy took place.
The estimation procedure consists in a logit model, here applied to different specifications, as displayed in Table 3 . Regardless of whether CEO-or bank-specific characteristics are considered separately or jointly, none of the variables has a significant impact on the probability that an intermediary is considered part of the group of treated banks. These results seem to rule out the presence of sorting for the banks in the treatment policy.
Change in response of CEOs' compensation over time
As a first step to verify our testable implications (Hypothesis 1, 3 and 4), we examine how the correlations of CEO compensation with respect to measures of bank performance and risk have changed over time. In each year we measure the difference in response of CEO compensation to performance and risk compared to 2011, i.e. the year of the treatment. To this aim we divide our sample around 2011 as the benchmark year and estimate the following equation:
where Y it indicates the share of variable compensation in period t of bank i. The time-varying coefficients γ t measure the difference in the effect of a specific explanatory variable in W it on the dependent variable Y it at time τ relatively to the benchmark year 2011. Furthermore, we add bank time-invariant fixed effects (α i ) and time fixed effects (λ t ) to absorb all common variation due to time, shared by all banks.
The vector W it contains the return on equity (ROE t ), its lagged value (ROE t−1 ) and contemporaneous stock return volatility (SRV t ). 6 We prefer to measure profitability with ROE rather than ROA, because the latter measure tends to overestimate bank profitability for banks that have a large portion of non-interest sources of income (trading income, fees and commissions for services) as these revenues are not reflected in (and therefore cannot be scaled by) total assets. However, as a robustness check not reported here, we have performed the analysis with ROA and the percentage of non-performing on total loans (NPL) as alternative measures of profitability and risk: in both cases we obtain similar results.
In Figure 6 , we plot the estimated coefficients at each point in time (the reference year is normalized to zero). In other words, each bullet represents the sum of the coefficients τ t attached to the dependent variable W it , summing up the contemporaneous and, where available, the lagged value, in a specific year τ . The aim is to illustrate the changes in correlation between compensation and measures of performance and risk in order to detect the presence of a possible structural shock.
First of all, comparing the behavior of treated banks with the control group (not-treated banks), we see that prior to 2011 the trends are similar both in terms of ROE and SRV. After 2011 the trends between the two groups tend to diverge. This provides some preliminary evidence that the treatment had some effect (Hypothesis 1): as a matter of fact those two groups before the treatment don't show a statistically different behavior. We can notice that actually before 2011 the coefficients for SRV were indeed increasing for the treated banks and switched to a decreasing trend after 2011, while the control group does not show this feature.
This is preliminary evidence that the treatment policy has been effective. Although this analysis is suggestive of some changes occurred in the structure of CEO compensation, it could be confounded with the fall in measures of performance to which the variable part of the compensation is tied. As alternative explanation, it could be that the change in regulation have had an impact on the way banks pay their CEOs. To disentangle macroeconomic factors from the regulatory ones, we study how the share of variable compensation is affected by changes in performance and risk within an econometric analysis to control for all confounding factors, such as bank and country characteristics.
Effect of the P&S policy on CEO compensation: A diff-in-diff approach
In this section, we test for changes in the impact of profitability and risk on the share of variable compensation before and after the introduction of the P&S controlling for changes in common and bank idiosyncratic factors. For each bank i and year t, we run the following regression:
where the dependent variable Y it is the share of variable compensation for bank i at time t, X it is a vector of bank or country explanatory variables, W it includes measures of profitability and risk. Similarly to the previous regression analysis, the vector W it contains the return on equity (ROE t ), its lagged value (ROE t−1 ) and the contemporaneous stock return volatility (SRV t ).
interactions among dummies and continuous variables. Finally, α i and λ t denote bank and time fixed effects, respectively. Among the dummy variables we include:
• "Post" which takes value 1 if year > 2011 to capture the change in regulation;
• "Inv", which takes value 1 when the bank is an investment bank;
• "Treated" which takes value 1 if the bank is under the scope of application of the P&S policy or headquartered in one of the EU countries. Table 4 reports the results of the baseline regression. The profitability measure includes the contemporaneous and the one-period lagged value to account for profitability in the short run. The estimated coefficients of the lagged and current explanatory variable are summed up for the sake of brevity (with the associated standard errors being provided in parentheses). We measure bank profitability by its return on equity (ROE) or return on assets (ROA). We consider both measures in a simplified model (Specifications (1) and (3) and with interactions of the main variables with a specific dummy for investment banks in Specifications (2) and (4) Among the macroeconomic controls we test for GDP growth of the country where the bank is located and we find that it has no significant impact on the share of variable compensation. Table 5 shows the estimation results of the complete version of equation (2), in which we added the dummy for treatment and its interactions with the bank-specific variables.
As before, the coefficients are computed as the sum of the current and lagged coefficient values (with associated standard errors in brackets). We report the results for the benchmark regression using ROE as the profitability measure in the first column, while ROA in the second column. The regression with the treatment shows a better fit to the data (higher within R 2 ).
The individual effects for commercial and investment banks, as well as a weighted average (all), are reported in Tables 6 and 7 showing the aggregate effects for treated and not-treated banks before and after the implementation of the P&S policy. The difference between pre-and post-treatment, namely the impact of the treatment, is provided in column (∆). As can be seen from Tables 6 and 7 , there is a significant decline in the response of variable compensation vis-à-vis a bank's short-term profitability for the whole sample of banks (Hypothesis 3). However, a more detailed analysis reveals differences across business models. Specifically, we find a significant decline for both treated (−0.297 * * ) and not-treated (−0.806 * ) commercial banks.
The latter is statistically marginally significant and might be explained by spillover effects among banks. In other words, regulation that draws on the corporate governance of a set of banks, here the treated banks, also affects other banks operating in the same business as an "implied obligation". On the contrary, no significant change can be observed for all investment banks.
As we suggested in the previous section, CEOs' variable compensation is also related to bank market risk, here measured as banks' stock return volatility, calculated on a weekly base from stock prices. As Table 4 shows, ignoring the treatment status, higher market risk leads on average to a lower share of variable compensation. After the implementation of the P&S policy, we observe a significant increase in the (negative) correlation of CEO variable compensation for all treated banks regardless of their business model (Hypothesis 4). The effect is particularly significant for investment banks. Contrary to the case of profitability, we do not observe spillovers on the elasticity to risk from treated to not-treated banks: as a matter of fact the change in the elasticity of the share of variable compensation with respect to market risk is 7 Notice that the variable compensation may in principle also increase when there is a change in CEO. One the one hand, incoming CEOs may be given a "golden handshake" when taking their new job (since they may have foregone bonuses at their old bank); on the other hand, outgoing CEOs pocket the "golden parachute" even when they have contributed to the increased outcome of risks in the bank they are leaving. not statistically significant for the control group.
The role of the risk management function
The regulator has taken a "one size does not fit all" approach. Hence we must control for bank-specific characteristics that might explain the different impact of the policy such as the quality of corporate governance (Hypothesis 2).
In particular, we can control for the importance of the risk management function in the governance of the bank. We replicate the results of the previous analysis by replacing the dummy for the business model with a dummy indicating the presence of the CRO (Chief Risk Officer). The results in Tables 8, 9 and 10 indicate that our main results on the response of the variable compensation to changes in short-term profitability are driven by the group of banks that do not have a CRO in the board. Specifically, we find no significant impact of short-term profitability on CEOs' variable compensation for banks where a CRO is present. For banks without a CRO, on the other hand, we detect a significant positive influence of profitability on CEOs' variable compensation before the P&S were implemented, which drops significantly and becomes insignificant afterwards. For treated banks with (without) a CRO, the effect of risk on CEOs' variable compensation is negative (positive) before the regulation took place. In both cases, the response decreased significantly in the subsequent period. For not-treated banks without a CRO, variable compensation heavily depends on bank risk before the P&S came into force. This effect becomes insignificant in the subsequent period. For not-treated banks with a CRO, on the other hand, no significant effect from risk is detected, regardless of the time period. The results indicate that the P&S policy has been more effective in changing the compensation structure for the banks that have a weaker internal risk governance. This is in line with Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) .
Another question of interest concerns the change of the banks' CEO after the P&S were implemented (Hypothesis 5). Table 11 reports the results of a logit model with the appointment of a new CEO as the binary dependent variable taking the value of 1 if a new CEO enters the bank in year t and 0 otherwise. Interestingly, the likelihood of a CEO change decreased after the implementation of the P&S, whether bank fixed effects are included (Specification (1)) or not (Specification (4)). As soon as the treatment status as well as bank-specific characteristics and CEO compensation growth are considered (Specifications (2,3,5,6)), no significant clustering in pre and post P&S periods can be observed. The same is true for the bank-and CEO-specific variables themselves with the exception of bank size proxied by its total assets when bank fixed effects are not included.
Summary of results
Our analysis finds that the P&S policy had an impact on the share of CEOs' variable compensation (Hypothesis 1). In particular, the share of variable compensation is negatively correlated with risk for the treated banks (Hypothesis 4). Similar, but less pronounced, is the effect of banks' profitability on the variable part of compensation (Hypothesis 3). An interesting finding is that the impact of the policy has been heterogeneous across banks with different business models and with different governance quality with respect to risk management (Hypothesis 2), lending support to the idea that the P&S are not a "one size fits all" policy. In particular, the response of variable compensation with respect to profitability has fallen for both treated and, to some extent, also for not-treated commercial banks, while we find no effect for investment banks. Instead, the response of the variable part of the compensation on risk has become significantly negative for both type of business models.
In line with the existing literature, we find that the varying governance quality across banks with respect to risk management matters for the impact of the policy. In particular, for those banks that had a CRO before the introduction of the policy, the impact of the P&S policy has been lower. Finally, we do not find the P&S policy to have any particular effect on CEO turnover (Hypothesis 5).
Robustness checks
In this section we perform several robustness checks. First, we examine if the sensitivity of the results really depends on differences in bank's business model. Second, we control for a set of concurrent events when the P&S was adopted in 2011, such as the global financial crisis or the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, we control for the clustering of other regulatory changes in those years that may have affected the structure of CEO compensation around the date of the implementation of the principles.
Ignoring bank business models
To control for the differential effect according to the business model, we take a simplified version of the benchmark model, as presented in the previous section, where we do not split the sample according to the different bank business models (commercial vs investment banks). The results displayed in Tables A.1 to A.3 replicate the benchmark regression, without the dummy for the investment banks. While we observe that our previous findings hold in this simplified version of the benchmark model, the tests are weaker (even if still significant) compared to the benchmark specification: this tells us that investment banks do indeed behave differently from commercial banks. This evidence provides support for the notion that the policy's impact differed between those two business models.
Global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis
While the P&S policy was adopted in 2011, several other important economic events occurred almost at the same time. These concurrent factors may partly explain the changes we observe in the structure of CEOs' compensation. From an econometric point of view it could be difficult to disentangle between the effect of these factors and those of the P&S policy. However, we check the robustness of our results for at least some of these concurrent factors by exploiting the fact that these factors did not affect countries at the same way and with the same timing. Finally, as a consequence of the banking crisis, several countries had to inject public money to bail out their banks. In those countries that had already accumulated a large public debt, this caused an additional sovereign debt crisis. The countries involved were the so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain). We therefore add, to the baseline specification, a dummy to control if CEO variable compensation has responded differently in these countries.
Our main results are robust to this control, as shown by the coefficients in Tables A.7 to A.9.
Timing of the regulatory changes
In a final robustness check we control for a different response of CEO variable compensation for all the treated banks based in EU countries, but not belonging to FSB countries. This is to control for the difference in the timing of adoption of the policy, since the EU countries have adopted the P&S policy as part of the CRD IV in 2014, that is, later than the rest of the FSB countries. In the meantime, we add a country-specific control for the UK to capture the reform that set a cap on bankers' compensations in 2009 (see Kleymenova and Tuna (2016) ).
Results are robust to this control, as shown by the coefficients in Tables A.10 to A.12.
Conclusions
This paper studies how the structure of bank CEO compensation has changed after the introduction of the Principles and Standards of Sound Compensation Practices in 2011. To run the test, we exploit the fact that the new regulation was not applied to all banks and therefore we could split intermediaries between two groups, "affected" intermediaries and an "unaffected" control group. As CEO compensation is influenced by many factors, we constructed a detailed database sourced from S&P Capital IQ that reports information on the different elements of banks' CEO compensation and we integrated it with bank balance sheet information and other information on the macroeconomic and institutional setting.
The introduction of the P&S could have been, at least in part, anticipated by banks. Therefore, in a preliminary analysis, we have shown by means of year-by-year regressions that the behavior of affected banks and the control group were similar before 2010 and different afterwards. Another concern is that affected banks and their CEOs could have some special characteristics, independent of the introduction of the P&S, that could make them different from the control group (for example, by being more risk-averse). A specific test for dynamic sorting has dissipated this doubt, indicating that the characteristics of CEOs are similar between the two groups. We finally checked by means of an econometric model that tests for the presence of a structural break if variable compensation, as a share of total compensation, has been less correlated with short-term profit and more correlated with risk after 2011, as regulators would intend.
We find that bankers' pay regulation had a significant impact on the structure of CEO compensation of the banks under the scope of the application of the policy. For the affected commercial banks we find that, after the introduction of the P&S, the share of variable compensation has been less (positively) correlated with short-term profit and more (negatively) correlated with bank risk. For the group of affected investment banks, on the one hand, we detect clearly the effect on risk, indicating that banks' risk-taking has been affected by the introduction of the P&S. The correlation with short-term bank profits for investment banks, on the other hand, remains similar (weak) before and after the introduction of P&S. Furthermore, within the control group, we find some "spillover effects" of the introduction of the P&S only for commercial banks and for short-term profits (even if the effect is statistically only marginally significant). In all the remaining tests, we do not detect any significant effect of the introduction of the P&S on CEO variable compensation for the control group (unaffected banks). Finally, our results are more pronounced for investment banks and for the banks without a CRO in place. This result is in line with Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and suggests that the policy has been most effective at banks where governance of risk management was weaker.
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